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RECENT CASE NOTES
APPEAL AND ERROR-DUE PROCESS--NEW ISSUE ON APmL.-In a trial be-
fore a justice of the peace, whose compensation depended upon convictions,
the defendant was found guilty of violating the liquor statutes, and fined.
Objections to the justice's disqualification on the grounds of interest were
raised for the first time in the intermediate appellate court, where the
judgment below was affirmed. On a writ of error to the supreme court,
the defendant claimed that he had been denied "due process of law." Held,
that no objection having been made in the trial court, a new issue could
not be raised on appeal. Tari v. State, 159 N. E. 594 (Ohio, 1927).
Generally, on appeal no new issue may be raised. Winstein v. Laughlin,
21 F. (2d) 740 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927). Lack of jurisdiction is a recognized
exception to this rule. O'Connor v. Slaker, 22 F. (2d) 147 (C. C. A. 8th,
1927) (state's immunity from suit); Ex parte Sifola, 138 At]. 369 (N. J.
Eq. 1927) (trial in one state for crime committed in another). It has been
said that constitutional questions may be brought up for the first time on
appeal where capital charges are involved. Hack v. State, 141 Wis. 346,
351, 124 N. W. 492, 494 (1910). And constitutionality of a statute has
been raised for the first time by an appellate court on its own initiative in
an ordinary civil suit. Kraus v. Lehman, 170 Ind. 408, 83 N. E. 714 (1903).
But such procedure is at least unorthodox. Lcontas v. City of Savannah,
138 S. E. 154 (Ga. 1927); Martin, A Notable Deciion (1908) 42 Am. L.
REv. 641. The instant case arises in consequence of a recent Supreme
Court decision that a trial before a judge whose fees are derived from con-
victions is a denial of due process. Tomcy v. State, 273 U. S. 510, 47 Sup.
Ct. 437 (1927) ; see Comment (1927) 36 YAM E LAw JOURnN,%L 1171. There,
however, the constitutional objection was raised at the trial and the pres-
ent question was not involved. Other decisions subsequent to the Tumcy
case have likewise held that the disqualification of a judge upon constitu-
tional grounds may not be raised for the first time on appeal. Comnwo-
wealth v. Dabbienro, 290 Pa. 174, 138 Atl. 679 (1927); Bryant v. State,
112 So. 675 (Mliss. 1927). Yet a federal court has allowed such disqualifica-
tion to be attacked collaterally in a petition for habeas corpus, although
not raised at the first trial. Ex parte Baer, 20 F. (2d) 912 (Ky. 1927).
On the assumption that the statute conferring jurisdiction was constitu-
tional, and since a capital offense was not involved, the doctrine that a con-
stitutional question must be raised at the earliest opportunity seems to
have been properly invoked by the court in the instant case.
BILLS AND NOTES-FORWARDING CHECK To DrAwEE-DUE PRESENTh1ENT-
EFFECT OF BANK COLLECTION STATUTE.-The plaintiff gave the defendant
a check in part payment for a tractor. The check was deposited on the
next day and on the day following was forwarded to the drawee. Several
days later the drawee failed without having paid, although it had had
sufficient funds. The plaintiff, who had given a mortgage to the defendant
as security for his supposedly unpaid debt, brought this action to enjoin
foreclosure proceedings, contending that he had been discharged as drawer
on the check. To show due presentment the defendant relied on a statute
which provided that forwarding an item for collection to the drawee "shall
be deemed due diligence" on the part of the forwarding bank. Both de-
fendant and his bank had some knowledge of the drawee's unsound condi-
tion. The lower court gave judgment for the plaintiff. Held, on appeal,
that the judgment be affirmed since (1) neither the defendant in depositing
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the item, nor his bank in forwarding it to the drawee, exercised due dili-
gence and (2) no sufficient notice of dishonor was given the plaintiff.
Blackwelder v. Fergus Motor Co., 260 Pac. 734 (Mont. 1927).
In the absence of statute or a special agreement it is generally held to
be negligence per se for a collecting agent to send a check to the drawee
bank for payment, since a drawee bank in financial difficulties might delay
payment. Maronde v. Vokenweider, 279 S. W. 774 (Mo. 1926); 2 Paton,
Digest (1926) § 1483a. And this is so where the drawee bank is the only
one in the locality. Winchester Milling Co. v. Bank of Winchester, 120
Tenn. 225, 111 S. W. 248 (1907). But cf. Spokane Valley Bank v. Lutes,
133 Wash. 66, 233 Pac. 308 (1925); Brady, Bank Checks (2d ed. 1926)
§ 269. Many states, however, have statutes similar to that in the instant
case sanctioning such action on the part of the collecting bank if it has
used due diligence in other respects. 2 Paton, lc. cit. supra. Federal Re-
serve Banks, pursuant to regulation of the Reserve Board, stipulate for
the privilege to do likewise. Cf. Federal Reserve Bank v. Malloy, 264 U.
S. 160, 44 Sup. Ct. 296 (1924). It would seem that the purpose of these
provisions is merely to give the collecting bank the privilege of handling
collections in this manner without responsibility to the depositor. It has
been held, however, under the statute that the adoption of a longer though
usual method of collection would not constitute due presentment. Federal
Land Bank v. Barrow, 189 N. C. 303, 127 S. E. 3 (1925). Contra: Dudley
v. Phenix-Girard Bank, 114 So. 188 (Ala. 1927). In any event the instant
holding that the statute does not operate to constitute a sending to the
drawee bank a due presentment when the drawee is known to be in failing
condition is to be approved. Probably also the forwarding bank could be
held responsible to the depositor for negligence in such case. As the de-
fendant delayed in giving notice the court's ruling that the drawer was
discharged must also be sustained although the item was a check. Bran-
nan, Negotiable Instruments Law (4th ed. 1926) 884. This phase of the
situation, however, presents a serious risk to depositors. If the drawee
is regarded as a collecting agent to present to itself and to protest and to
give notice of dishonor, a failure in either regard would appear to discharge
indorsers, notwithstanding the statute. Or if the sending is regarded as
merely a presentment, the delay on the part of the sending bank before
notice could be sent would again seem to work a discharge of secondary
parties. This notwithstanding that in each case the forwarding bank might
not be responsible to the depositor by reason of the collection statute. Both
the "agency" and "presentment" views have been taken where other issues
were involved. Winchester Milling Co. v. Bank of Winchester, supra
(drawee of check described as agent) ; Indig v. National City Bank, 80 N,
Y. 100 (1880) (sending of note to bank at which payable regarded as pre-
sentment).
BILLS AND NOTES-RESPONSIBILITY OF AGENT SIGNING WITHOUT AUTHOR-
ITY.---The plaintiff sued on a promissory note. The defendant, who had
signed the instrument as agent, but without authority, contended that he
was responsible only for breach of warranty of authority, and not on the
instrument. From a denial of his motion to dismiss the suit, the defendant
appealed. Held, that the judgment be affirmed, on the ground that the
agent was responsible under § 20 of the N. L L. Georgia Nat'l Bank v.
Lippmann, 226 N. Y. Supp. 233 (1st Dept. 1928).
The original draft of § 20 of the N. I. L. reads: "Where a person adds
to his signature words indicating that he signs for or in behalf of a prin-
cipal or in a representative capacity, he is not liable on the instrument."
This is the same as the English section, under which one signing as agent
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but without authority is responsible only for breach of warranty. Craw-
ford, Negotiable Instruments Law (1897) 26. Thus, the measure of dam-
ages would be only nominal if the "principal" was insolvent. But § 20 as
adopted contains the further clause, "if he is duly authorized." This has
been construed as making such signer responsible on the instrument if he
was not authorized. Pain v. Holtcavp, 10 F. (2d) 443 (C. C. A. 8th,
(1925) ; Austin, Nichols and Co. v. Gross, 93 Conn. 782, 120 Atl. 596 (1923) ;
(1925) 9 MINN. L. REv. 666; (1923) 23 COL. L. REv. 392. Such construc-
tion has been said to be based upon a mere negative implication of § 20.
(1906) 10 LAw NoTEs (American) 104. But in view of the added clause,
such interpretation would seem to be giving effect to the intention of the
framers of the act. See 2 Williston, Contracts (1920) 2122. Yet the
plain language of the first draft of this section indicates a purpose quite
distinct from the instant problem, i. e., to regard words of capacity as more
than descriptio personw and thereby to avoid holding the signer as a maker
of the instrument. See Comment (1918) 27 YALE LAW JounAL 686; Bran-
nan, Negotiable Instra'ments Law (4th ed. 1926) 164. Holding the signer
responsible on the instrument imposes a stricter responsibility than is usual
under agency or contract law. Afechem, Agenc (3d ed. 1923) § 354;
(1925) 35 YALE LAw JOURNAL 625; (1926) 26 COL. L. hRiv. 224. But it is
submitted that this is desirable in its practical business aspect, as increas-
ing transferability and resolving uncertainty as to the amount of the plain-
tiff's recovery. Cf. Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1, 20 (U. S. 1842); M Keehan,
in Brannon, op. cit. supra at 163. But certainty and uniformity would
probably be more readily obtained by amending the N. I. L. expressly to
make one signing as agent, but unauthorized, responsible on the instrument.
CONTRCTS-ENFORCIBILrrY OF CHARITABLE SuBscRuPTONS.-The deceased
promised the plaintiff college $5000, due thirty days after her death, to be
used as a fund to support a memorial scholarship bearing her name. The
establishment of such scholarship was not mandatory under the college
charter. Before her death she paid $1000 in advance which sum was set
aside for the fund, and, soon after, she repudiated her promise. In an
action against her executor to recover the unpaid balance, it was held
(two judges dissenting) that the college, by accepting part payment toward
the special memorial purpose, impliedly promised to do everything necessary
on its part in relation to the fund and thereby created a bilateral contract.
Allegheny College v. National Bank, 246 N. Y. 369, 159 N. E. 173 (1927).
The New York courts have not been friendly to charitable subscriptions
and have upheld them in only a limited number of situations. Wilson and
Thompson v. Baptist Society, 10 Barb. 308 (Sup. Ct. N. Y. 1851) (recov-
ery denied, facts as in instant case but no advance payment) ; Hull v. Pear-
son, 38 App. Div. 588, 56 N. Y. Supp. 518 (2d Dept. 1899) (recovery
denied though court might have found action in reliance); Presbyterian
Church v. Cooper, 112 N. Y. 517; 20 N. E. 352 (18S9) (same); see 48 L.
R. A. (N. s.) 783, 784 (1914) annotation. The instant case would seem to
go far toward reversing this attitude. In New York, and doubtless every-
-where, the promise is enforced if it is ex\pressed to be given in exchange for
an act by the "charity," and the act is done. Matter of Conger, 113 Miec.
129, 184 N. Y. Supp. 74 (Surr. Ct. 1920) ; cf. Lafayette Corp. v. Ryland, 80
Wis. 29, 49 N. W. 157 (1891). Likewise, where the promisee has detriment-
ally changed its position in reliance upon the promise, though under no bar-
gain. Keuk-a College v. Ray, 167 N. Y. 96, 60 N. E. 325 (1901) ; ef. Eastern
States League v. Vail's Estate, 97 Vt. 495, 124 Atl. 568 (1924); (1924)
34 YALE LAw JOURNAL 99. Yet New York cases would indicate that where
there has been no detriment, recovery could be had only on the facts of
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the instant case, i.e., where the purpose is special and memorial and part
payment has been made. Presbyterian Church v. Cooper, supra (recovery
denied, purpose merely general, no advance made); Hull v. Pearson, supra
(recovery denied, purpose special, part payment made). Thus the New
York courts have apparently made "memorial purpose" a criterion and
uphold the promise only where the promisor has expressed a desire to
have his memory embalmed. Cf. Wilmot, C. J., in Attorney General v.
Downing, Wilm. 1, 33 (1767). New York now allows an ordinary donee-
beneficiary to sue on a contract. Seaver v. Ransom, 224 N. Y. 233, 120
N. E. 639 (1918) (not a charitable subscripton). It has been suggested
that a charity could recover onj this ground. See Billig, The Problem of
Consideration in Charitable Subscriptions (1927) 12 CORN. L. Q. 467, 475.
And a few cases have been so decided. Clark Memorial Ass'n v. Coleman's
Estate, 222 Mich. 599, 193 N. W. 219 (1923); see Baptist Female Univer-
sity v. Borden, 132 N. C. 476, 493, 44 S. E. 47, 53 (1903). Assuming the de-
sirability of enforcing charitable subscriptions, this latter ground would
seem unobjectionable and within the orthodox bargain theory of considera-
tion where the promises are expressedly mutual. It is submitted that the
policy in not upholding ordinary promises, based upon lack of consideration,
has no application in charitable promises.
CORPORATIONS--SHARES CREATED IN VIOLATION OF "BLUE SKY" LAWS IN
A HOLDER WITH KNOWLEDE.-In an action by the plaintiff to collect salary
alleged due, the defendant corporation filed a cross-complaint to recover
payment for certain shares. The plaintiff knew that such shares had
been created in violation of conditions set forth in a permit given by the
Corporation Commissioner. The plaintiff also participated in shareholders'
meetings, and never offered to surrender his share certificates until the date
of the trial. From a judgment on the cross-complaint for the plaintiff,
the defendant appeals. Held, that the judgment be affirmed, on the ground
that a corporation acquires no right to payment for shares created in
violation of the "Blue Sky" Law, nothwithstanding the shareholder's knowl-
edge of the breach at the time of the original transaction. Parrish v. Ain.
Ry. Employees' Pub. Corp., 256 Pac. 590 (Cal. 1927).
A shareholder without knowledge at the time of the original transac-
tion may plead a violation of a "Blue Sky" Law, and defeat a claim by
the corporation for the agreed return. Dixie Rubber Co. v. McBee, 148
Tenn. 168, 253 S. W. 353 (1923); Witt v. Trustees' Loan and Savings, Co.,
33 Ga. App. 802, 127 S. E. 810 (1925); Burlington Hotel Co. v. Bell, 192
N. C. 620, 135 S. E. 616 (1926). Contra: Sherman v. Smith, 185 Iowa 054,
169 N. W. 216 (1918); Watters & Martin Inc. v. Homes Corp., 136 Va.
114, 116 S. E. 366 (1923); Warren People's Market Co. v. Corbett & Sons,
114 Ohio St. 126, 151 N. E. 51 (1926). Courts are not likely, moreover,
to construe any ordinary act of the holder as a waiver of this defense.
Farm Products Co. of Mich. v. Jordan, 229 Mich. 235, 201 N. W. 198 (1924)
.(acceptance of dividends); of. Reno v. Am. Ice Machine Co., 72 Cal. App.
409, 237 Pac. 784 (1925) (participation in shareholders' meeting) ; but see
Winfred Farmers' Co. v. Smith, 47 S. D. 498, 199 N. W. 477 (1924) (ex-
ercise of shareholdership for nine years). Such a defense would also pre-
vail against corporate creditors. Goodyear v. Meux, 143 Tenn. 287, 228
S. W. 57 (1921). But see Hancock v. Frederick Co-op. Mercantile Co.,
48 S. D. 1, 3, 201 N. W. 714, 715 (1925). But not if the requirements
of the statute are subsequently satisfied. Moore v. Moffatt, 188 Cal. 1, 204
Pac. 220 (1922). Under such circumstances, the holder may also be held
to a double statutory responsibility to corporate creditors. Parker v. Mer-
ritt, 164 Minn. 305, 204 N. W. 941 (1925); Hancock v. Frederick Co-op.
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Mercantile Co., supra. But not if the provisions of the "Blue SLy" Law
have, never been complied with. Honn v. Hamer, 253 Pac. 336 (Cal. 1927).
Yet the claim for restoration for the amount paid by such a holder is de-
ferred in the event of bankruptcy proceedings until after the satisfaction
of the claims of general corporate creditors. In re Racine Auto Tire Co.,
290 Fed. 939 (C. C. A. 7th, 1923). But recovery will be allowed against
a solvent corporation for the amount paid. Otten v,. Riesencr Chocolate Co.,
254 Pac. 942 (Cal. 1927); Edward v. 1oo, 205 Mich. 617, 172 N. W. 620
(1919); Guaranty Mortgage Co. v. Wilcox, 62 Utah 184, 218 Pac. 133
(1923) (recovery allowed on a counterclaim). And even though the cor-
poration subsequently complied with the provisions of the statute. Reno
v. Am. Ice Mach. Co., supra; cf. Boss v. Sildit Dramna Szdicate, 255 Pac.
225 (Cal. 1927). And notwithstanding the fact the holder participated in
corporate affairs after knowledge of the violation. Reno v. Am. Ice Ma-
chine Co., supra. But if the recipient knew at the time of the original
transaction that the "Blue Sky" Law was being violated, no recovery will
be allowed. Domenigoni v. Izpcrial Live Stock and Mortgage Co., 180 Cal.
467, 209 Pac. 36 (1922). To prevent circumvention of the "Blue Sky"
Law, such a result would seem desirable. Conversely, by denying redress
to the corporation against a holder with knowledge, the instant court has
wisely provided another deterrent to breaches of the "Blue Sky" Law.
CRmNAL LAw-FEDERAL PROBATION ACT-PROBATION AFTER EXECUTION
OF SENTENCE COMAWNCED.-The defendant was sentenced to three months
imprisonment for violation of the National Prohibition Act, and commenced
serving his term. The day following the sentence, the District Court en-
tered an order placing him on probation. The United States took the case
to the Circuit Court of Appeals by writ of error which certified to the
Supreme Court the question whether under the Federal Probation Act [43
Stat. 1259, (1925) U. S. Comp. Stat. (Supp. 1925) § 10504 4/5] the dis-
trict court had authority to place the defendant on probation after he had
commenced serving his term. Held, that the order be reversed on the
ground that the court had no such power. United States v. Mrray, 48
Sup. Ct. 146 (1928).
It has been held that the Federal Probation Act, supra, can be applied
after beginning of service of sentence. United States v. Chafina, 14 F. (2d)
622 (D. Ariz. 1926); see United States v'. Nir, 8 F. (2d) 759, 762 (S. D.
Cal. 1925). But see Nix v. James, 7 F. (2d) 590, 594 (C. C. A. 9th, 1925).
This has been approved on the ground that the Federal Parole Act [36 Stat.
819, (1910) U. S. Comp. Stat. (1916) § 10535] does not afford relief in all
cases since, under that act, a prisoner may be paroled only after serving
one third of his sentence. (1927) 36 YALE LAW JOURNAL 420. But most of
the lower federal courts have held to the contrary. Davis v. United States,
15 F. (2d) 697 (D. C. 1926); Mouse v. United States, 14 F. (2d) 202 (D.
Kan. 1926); United States v. Young 17 F. (2d) 129 (N. D. Cal. 1927).
The interference by a judge with a closed sentence, after the prisoner
has been incarcerated, has been said to be very close to the exercise
of the pardoning power, lodged in the executive and not in the court. See
Davis v. United States, supra at 699. On the one hand the shame and
stigma of imprisonment which the Probation Act in proper cases seeks
to avoid will probably have already been accomplished. See Archer Vi.
Snook, 10 F (2d) 567, 568 (N. D. Ga. 1926). But on the other hand pro-
bation also aims at the accomplishment of other purposes. (1927) 36 YL
LAw JOURNAL 420. It might be desirable not to burden the courts with peti-
tions for which the Parole board was created. Criticism might well be
directed to the Parole Act, which requires one third of the prisoner's sen-
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tence to be served before the Parole Board can act, since this requirement
is based upon two questionable assumptions, viz, that the purpose of im-
prisonment is punitive and that it is possible to determine from an individ-
ual under confinement, whether he will be a decent citizen on release, com-
pletely overlooking the fact that the most important stimulus to good be-
havior in prison, is the hope of an early release. Sutherland, Ci'imdnology
(1924) 545.
CRIMINAL LAw-INDICTMENT-VARIANCE BETWEEN NAME ALLEGED AND
PROVED.-The defendant was convicted of embezzlement and claimed, after
the verdict, that there was a fatal variance between the indictment and
the proof. The name of the prosecuting witness was McMurrain, but It
was set forth in the indictment as "McMurray." Held that the variance
was fatal and that the idem sonans rule was inapplicable. May v. State,
114 So. 788 (Ala. 1927).
In states which have no statutory provision for variance due to mistake
in a party's name, the strict rule making the variance fatal seemingly ap-
plies. Southern Express Co. v. State, 23 Ga. App. 67, 97 S. E. 550 (1918)
(allegation of name of defendant's agent, though not required must be
proved as alleged); People v. Novotney, 305 Ill. 549, 137 N. E. 394 (1922)
(prosecuting witness' name). The same states, however, find no fatal vari-
ance where the person is known by the name used in the indictment. Jen-
kins v. State, 4 Ga. App. 859, 62 S. E. 574 (1908) (where indictment in-
cludes name and alias, it is sufficient to prove either) ; People v. Chrfrikas,
295 Ill. 222, 129 N. E. 73 (1920); Bloclman v. State, 115 So. 399 (Miss.
1928); of. Complete Tex. Stat., Crim. Code (1920) § 456. Similarly, whore
the identity of the name in the indictment with the person produced on
trial is established. Chapman v. State, 33 Ga. App. 570, 126 S. E. 895
(1925) (no claim made that C. Hodges and C. L. Hodge were different
individuals). The question of variance can be avoided altogether by in-
voking the rule of idem sonano, which makes a variance in spelling imma-
terial where the ear can detect little difference, a rule obviously difficult of
predictability. Poldrack v. State, 86 Tex. Cr. R. 272, 216 S. W. 170 (1919)
(Matoska and Matosky); for good discussion see People v. Gormaeh, 302
Ill. 332, 134 N. E. 756 (1922); (1919) 17 MICH. L. Rv. 705. Some courts
find the variance immaterial where the defendant has notice of all facts
necessary to his defense and is protected against future prosecution for the
same offense. Bennet v. United States, 227 U. S. 333, 33 Sup. Ct. 288 (1912);
of. Williams v. State, 14 Okla. Cr. 100, 167 Pac. 763 (1917). One type of sta-
tute requires the defendant, when the variance concerns his name, to make
the correction before entering the plea. Neb. Comp. Stat. (1922) § 10114.
Another provides that errors as to names of any of the parties may be cor-
rected at any time before judgment. Ark. Dig. Stat. (Crawford, 1921)
§§ 3017-3018; of. Bridger v. State, 122 Ark. 391, 183 S. W. 962 (1916);
see also Okl. Comp. Stat. (1921) § 2557 (applying only to name of defend-
ant). In Alabama, unless the defendant consents to amending the indict-
ment, the prosecution must be dismissed with power in the court to order
another indictment drawn. Ala. Code (1923) §§ 4550-4551. The obvious
expense and delay involved where the variance is held fatal argues for a
liberal allowance of amendments and corrected records. See (1928) 37
YALE LAW JOuRNAL 383. Failure to object until after the verdict, it is
submitted, should constitute a waiver. It has been so heldr where the mis-
take concerns the defendant's name. Dunning v. State, 108 So. 82 (Ala.
1926); People v. Corbishley, 327 Ill. 312, 158 N. E. 732 (1927). See also
Neb. Comp. Stat. (1922) § 10113. But the same states held otherwise where
the error concerned the name of the prosecuting witness. Park v. State,
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106 So. 218 (Ala. 1925) ; People v. Novotny, supra- The holding of the in-
stant case may thus be justified on the grounds of stare dccisi3, but the
reason for the distinction is hidden.
DAASAGES--INSURANCR--"ACTUAL V.LuE."-In an action to recover in-
surance for the loss of a malt factory, insured for the "actual cash value,"
but not in excess of the cost of repair or replacement, the trial court in-
structed the jury to consider only the cost of replacement minus the physical
deterioration, although the building's utility and vendibility was greatly
diminished by national prohibition. The judgment was affirmed by the
Appellate Division. Held, on appeal, that the judgment be reversed since
the cost of replacement minus depreciation did not measure the loss. Me-
Anarney v. Newark Fire Ins. Co., 247 N. Y. 176, 159 N. E. 902 (1928).
Where similar goods are freely obtainable, the insurer's responsibility is
determined by the market value. Gibson v. Glen Falls Ins. Co., 111 Neb. 827,
197 N. W. 950 (1924) ; Goudie v. National Surety Co., 288 S. W. 3G9 (31o.
App. 1926). The problem of "actual cash value" becomes complex where
there is no "market value" as that term is used with respect to staple
commodities. The Supreme Court has indicated that the solution of this
difficulty lies in the "present fair value" test, with cost-of-reproduction-
minus-depreciation as the dominant element, not only in rate cases but for
all property valuation. Standard Oil Co. -r. So. Pac. Co., 268 U. S. 146,
45 Sup. Ct. 465 (1925) (damages for destruction of ship). But cf. People
v. Burke, 247 N. Y. 227, 160 N. E. 19 (1928) (valuation for issuance of
securities not conclusive for valuation for taxation). In the ordinary in-
surance case, replacement cost minus depreciation is held a satisfactory
substitute for market value. Svea Fire & Life Ins. Co. v. State Saringz
& Loan Ass'n, 19 F. (2d) 134 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927); Boise Ass'n of Credit
Men v. U. S. Fire Ins. Co., 256 Pac. 523 (Idaho, 1927). But ef. Chicago
Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Oliner, 139 Ald. 408, 115 At. 592. (1921) (original
cost for liquor lost after prohibition act). Where, as in the instant case,
there has been obsolescence, the reproduction cost minus physical deprecia-
tion is clearly not the equivalent of "actual value," whether from the point
of view of objective "exchange value" or subjective "utility value." Se-
curity Printing Go. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 245 S. W. 1089 (Mo. App.
1922). If the courts were to include obsolescence in "depreciation," they
would simply be making it a catch-all corrective for the discrepancy be-
tween cost of replacement and "value." In spite of the continuing in-
definiteness of "actual value," the ruling in the instant case is so obviously
desirable that it serves to illustrate the danger of giving the "present fair
value" rule a fixed connotation of "cost of reproduction-minus-depreciation"
if it is to be used as the test of "actual value" under all circumstances.
Such a vague method of determining value, however, is a serious hindrance
for rate making. Cf. Bonbright, Tie Problem of Judicial Valuation, 2
COL. L. REv. 493 (1927).
EVIDENCE-"DEAD AL-N" STATUTE--IDENTIFICATION OF HAN';DWfTING.-
The plaintiff brought an action as the payee of a promissory note against
the executor of the maker. Over objection he was allowed to testify that
he was familiar with the handwriting of the deceased, having seen him
write his name during his lifetime. Held, on appeal, that the testimony
was properly admitted since it was not barred by the statute prohibiting
testimony by an interested party to transactions or communications with
the deceased. Jewett v. Budwiek, 260 Pac. 247 (Wash. 1927).
"Dead man" statutes have been severely criticized on the ground that
they defeat honest claims of the living more often than they protect
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estates of the dead. 1 Wigmore, Evidence (2d ed. 1923) § 578; Taft,
Comments on Will Contests in New York (1921) 30 YALE LAIW JOURNAL
593, 605; (1927), 36 ibid. 576, 1185. The majority of courts have held with
the instant case that the identification of handwriting is not testimony
concerning a transaction or communication, but merely an expression of
opinion, which could not be controverted by the deceased if living, and
hence is not barred by the statute. Sankey v. Cook, 82 Iowa 125, 47 N. W.
1077 (1891); Johnson v. Bee, 84 W. Va. 532, 100 S. E. 486 (1919); Sattcr-
thwaite v. Davis, 186 N. C. 565, 120 S. E. 221 (1923). This extends to the
testimony of the personal representative of the deceased as well as to the
adverse party. Tucker v. Kellogg, 8 Utah 11, 28 Pac. 870 (1892). But
statements that the party has seen the deceased sign the instrument in
question are excluded. Bright v. Marcom, 121 N. C. 86, 28 S. E. 60 (1897).
And when the question was raised that the party had forged the deceased's
signature, it was reversible error to allow him to testify that he had not,
since this had the same probative force as a statement that deceased had
signed. Boyd v. Boyd, 164 N. Y. 234, 58 N. E. 118 (1900). A few courts
hold that since testimony to the genuineness of the signature tends ulti-
mately to prove the entire transaction, it is inadmissible. Oliver v. Oliver,
313 Ill. 612, 145 N. E. 123 (1924); Kirby v. Brooks, 111 So. 235 (Ala.
1927). The rule of the instant case seems to accomplish by indirection a de-
sirable result that might well be the basis of legislation.
EVIDENCE-PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS--PHYSICIAN AND PATIENT-
WAivER Or PR IvIGEIn an action by the beneficiary of an accident pol-
icy the defendant tried to prove that the insured committed suicide and
offered the testimony of three doctors to show certain statements made by
the insured on the night of his injury. Section 11263 of the Iowa Code
(1924) provides that: "No . . . physician . . . shall be allowed
to disclose any confidential communication intrusted to him in his
professional capacity. . . ." It also provides that the section will not
apply where the patient "waives the rights conferred." In excluding the
evidence the lower court held that there was no waiver by the patient as a
result of the following clause in the application: ". . . do you consent
that any physician and surgeon who has been consulted by you may be
examined touching any knowledge he may have acquired by reason of his
relation to you, and give information in regard thereto. . . . A. Yes."
Held, on appeal, that the judgment be affirmed. Pride v. Interstate Busi-
ness Men's Ass'n, 216 N. W. 62 (Iowa, 1927).
No waiver of the patient's power to object can be implied from the fact
that an insurance policy requires proofs of death. Maine v. Maryland Cas.
Co., 172 Wis. 350, 178 N. W. 749 (1920). But see 5 Wigmore, Evidence
(2d ed. 1923) § 2388. Cf. Western T. Ace. Ass'n v. Munson, 73 Neb. 858,
103 N. W. 688 (1905). But where there is a clause in the application sim-
ilar to the one in the instant case there is a waiver of the power with re-
gard to communications made at the time of or prior to the signing of the
application. Adreveno v. Mutual R. L. Ass'n, 34 Fed. 870 (C. C. Mo..
1888) ; Modern Woodmen v. Angle, 127 Mo. App. 94, 104 S. W. 297 (1907) ;
Bryant v. Modern Woodmen, 86 Neb. 372, 125 N. W. 621 (1910); Metro-
politan L. Ins. Co. v. Willisl, 37,Ind. App. 48, 76 N. E. 560 (1906) (com-
munications made after signing of application but before delivery of pol-
icy). Contra: N. Y. Civ. Prac. Act (1927) § 354; Holden v. Metropolitan
L. Ins. Co., 165 N. Y. 13, 58 N. E. 771 (1900); Gilchrist v. Mystic Workers,
188 Mich. 466, 154 N. W. 575 (1915). Similarly, evidence of communica-
tions made before or after signing of the application is admissible where the
clause provides for disclosure by a physician who has "heretofore attended
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or may hereafter attend." Metropolitan L. Ins. Co. v. Brubal:er, 78 Kan.
146, 96 Pac. 62 (1908); Fvzler v. Knights of Pythias, 129 N. C. 318, 40
S. E. 65 (1901); New York L. Ins. Co. -v. Snydcr, 158 N. E. 176 (Ohio,
1927). Likewise, evidence of future communications has been held ad-
missible where the clause waived the provisions of the statute that dis-
qualified "any physician from testifying concerning any information ob-
tained by him in a professional capacity." Trzdl v. Modcrn Woodmen,
12 Idaho 318, 85 Pac. 1081 (1906); Sovereign Camp v. Farmer, 11G Miss.
626, 77 So. 655 (1917). In line wth these cases it might reasonably have
been held that the clause in the instant case was a waiver of the power
as to future communications. It is quite likely that the clause was intended
to have such a construction. Most courts apparently have decided the ques-
tion without considering the exact wording of the clause or the time whcn
the communications were made. Adreveno v. Mutual R. L. Ass'n, aupra;
Keller v. Home L. In=. Co., 95 Mo. App. 627, 69 S. W. 612 (1902) ; Trzdl v.
Modern Woodmen, supra; Sovereign Camp v. Farmer, stpra; New York
L. Ins. Go. v. Snyder, supra. Such clauses have been held contrary to public
policy. Gilchrist v. Mystic Workers, supra; ef. Geare v. U. S. Life Ins.
Co., 66 Blinn. 91, 68 N. W. 731 (1896). Most cases are contra, however, on
the ground that insurance companies would otherwise be defrauded by sui-
cides. See New York Life Ins. Co. v. Snyder, supra, at 179.
INTEREST-NoN-UsURIOUs AGREEMENT TO PAY RATE HIGHEn Tiuw LEGAL
RATE AFTER MATURITY IS ENFORCELALE.-The plaintiff sued to recover the
principal and interest of certain mortgage notes executed by the defend-
ant. The notes provided for an interest rate of 6% before and 12% after
maturity. A statute provided: "Interest at the rate of six per centum
a year and no more, may be recovered and allowed in civil actions, includ-
ing actions to recover money loaned at a greater rate, as damages for the
detention of money after it becomes payable. . . ." Conn. Gn. Stat.
(1918) § 4797. In a foreclosure suit, only 6% interest after maturity was
allowed. Held, on appeal, that 125 could be recovered. Globe Invctmezt
Co. v. Barta, 140 At. 202 (Conn. 1928).
Contracts silent as to interest bear the legal rate from default. Bast
v. Sproll, 176 Wis. 371, 187 N. W. 223 (1922); Knight v. Barnwll, 1 0
Atl. 736 (N. J. 1925) (from maturity on time notes); Van Wict v. Kanter,
139 App. Div. 603, 124 N. Y. Supp. 63 (1st Dept. 1910) (from demand, or
from bringing of action on demand notes); 3 Williston, Contracts (1920)
§ 1410; 2 Paton's Digest (1926) § 2886a. Likewise the legal rate obtains
both before and after maturity where there is a provision to pay interest
but no rate is mentioned. Lines v. Potter, 42 S. D. 463, 176 N. W. 150
(1920). The legal rate also usually governs after maturity where the
contract provides for a rate other than the legal rate before maturity but
makes no provision for a rate after maturity. Pryor v. City of Buffalo,
197 N. Y. 123, 90 N. E. 423 (1909); Eaton v. Boi.msonnadt, 67 Me. 540
(1877). Contra: People v. Getzendaner, 137 Ill. 234, 34 N. E. 297 (1891)
(contract rate governs). However, if the rate is qualified by the words,
"until paid," or similar expressions, most courts hold that the rate con-
tinues after maturity. Smythe v. Inhabitants of New P'ovidncee, 203 Fed.
481 (C. C. A. 3d, 1920); Augusta Bank v. Hewins, 90 Mle. 255, 38 Atl. 156
(1897). Kansas has codified this rule. Kan. Gen. Stat. (1909) § 438.
Contra: Kaufmann v. Kaufmann, 239 Pa. 42, 86 Atl. 634 (1913). Where
interest is charged at a certain rate until maturity, a provision for a non-
usurious rate higher than the legal rate to apply retroactively after matur-
ity for the entire period is enforceable as applying only from maturity.
Robbinw v. Maddy, 95 Kan. 219, 147 Pac. 826 (1915) ; Scottish-Amer. Mort-
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gage Co. v. Wilson, 24 Fed. 310 (C. C. Kan. 1885). But a few courts en-
force the agreement literally. Finger v. Mcaughey, 114 Cal. 64, 45 Pac.
1004 (1896). Where this higher rate is expressly agreed to be operative
only after maturity, it is generally enforceable. Union Estates Co. v. Adlon
Construction Co., 221 N. Y. 183, 116 N. E. 984 (1917); 12 A. L. R. 363,
367 (1921) annotation; De Cordova v. Weeks, 246 Mass. 100, 140 N. E. 269
(1923) (rate must not be so high as to "shock the conscience of the court").
Contra: Chase v. Whitten, 62 Minn. 498, 65 N. W. 84 (1895). The higher
rate of interest after maturity so stipulated for has been held to be with-
out the purview of a statute, similar to the one in the instant case. Hub-
bard v. Callahan, 42 Conn. 524 (1875). It is not an unusual business prac-
tice to allow the borrower some time after the maturity of his mortgage
note to meet his obligations. A broad application of the Connecticut stat-
ute would probably result in increased pressure to force prompt payment.
Whether this would result in increased litigation, an undesirable result,
or greater promptness in paying, a desirable result, cannot be answered
abstractly. Conceivably, the undesirable aspect of the case would obtain,
coupled with a practice of demanding increased bonuses or higher rates
before maturity. In the absence of an express interdiction, the Connecticut
statute should be confined to cases where there is no stipulation by the
parties. Cf. Conn. Gen. Stat. (1918) § 4795; Minn. Gen. Stat. (1923) §
7036. The same applies to a demand note bearing a non-usurious rate of
interest higher than the legal rate.
LIENS-FILING-CONFORMITY REQUIREMENT-EFFECT OF STATE STAT-
UTES ON FEDERAL COURT JUDGENTS.-A Missouri statute provided that the
judgments of the lower state courts of record should constitute liens upon
rendition, but that judgments of the state appellate courts and federal
courts should be liens only when transcripts thereof were filed with the clerk
of a proper state circuit court. Mo. Rev. Stat. (1919) §§ 1554, 1555, 1556.
The Act of 1888 provides that transcripts may be required by state statutes
to make a federal court judgment a lien, provided the same requirements
are prescribed for state courts. 25 Stat. 357, (1888) U. S. Comp. Stat.
(1916) § 1606. The plaintiff purchased land at an execution sale on a
judgment rendered in the federal district court in Missouri. The defend-
ant claimed as a purchaser of the same land from the original owner
subsequent to the rendition of the judgment, of which no' transcript had
been filed, but prior to the execution sale. The Missouri Supreme Court
gave judgment for the defendant. On certiorari held, that the judgment
be reversed, since the Missouri statute was in conflict with the Act of 1888,
the requirement that a transcript be filed not applying to all state courts.
Rhea v. Smith, 274 U. S. 434, 47 Sup. Ct. 698 (1927).
The Act of 1888, by authorizing states to require the filing of transcripts
of federal court judgments, made it unnecessary to search the records of
federal courts as well as those of the office of the county clerk' to ascer-
tain the judgment liens on property within that county. See Dartmouth
Savings Bank v. Bates, 44 Fed. 546 (C. C. Kan. 1890). The statute must
in fact result in exact conformity in all material particulars between state
and federal court judgments. Lineker v. Dillon, 275 Fed. 460 (N. D. Cal.
1921); In re Jackson Light and Traction Co., 269 Fed. 223 (C. C. A. 5th,
1920) ; see Note (1928) 13 IowA L. REv. 203. Where the statute does not
seem to require conformity, but in fact results in requiring the necessary
conformity, it is no doubt valid. See Iowa Code (1927) §§ 11603, 11604.
The decision in the instant case has been forecast. See (1926) 35 YAL
LAw JOURNAL 637. This decision makes the validity of certain existing
enactments look dubious. Cf. Land Co. v. Husted, 263 Pa. 342, 106 Atl.
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540 (1919); see also Ohio Gen. Code (1926) §§ 2889-2890. States whose
judgments are in fact liens upon rendition only cannot take advantage of
the Act of 1888. See White, "Rc-Rlica v. Smith" (1927) 6 TITLE NEWS,
no. 10, p. 8.
MASTER AND SERVANT-FEDEAL EmPLoERsl' LIABILrTY Acr-Assumr-
TION OF RISK.-The plaintiff, a longshoreman, helping to load a ship, found
spots of grease on the passageway he had to use. He notified the gang-
way-man, -who said that he would tell the boss. The plaintiff continued
to work, and after an hour, slipped and broke his leg. In a suit for the
injury he recovered judgment. Held, on appeal, that the judgment be re-
versed on the ground that the plaintiff had assumed the risk and could not
recover under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. 35 Stat. 05 (1903)
45 U. S. C. A. § 51-59 as extended by 41 Stat 1007 (1920) 4G U. S. C. A.
§ 688. Yaconi v. Brady & Gioe, 246 N. Y. 300, 158 N. E. 876 (1927).
The Federal Employers' Liability Act was passed in response to a public
demand that the harshness of the common law towards the employee be
modified, a demand which had previously led to the passage of the Fed-
eral Safety Appliance Acts [27 Stat. 531, 32 Stat. 943]. Peterson, The
Joker in the Federal Employers' Liability Act (1915) 80 CENT. L. J. 5.
By abolishing the defenses of the fellow servant rule and contributory neg-
ligence it was, at the time, a liberal innovation in this country. But it
retained the defense of assumption of risk. Seaboard Air Line v. Horton,
233 U. S. 492, 34 Sup. Ct. 635 (1914). However, to help enforce the
Safety Appliance and kindred statutes, it is held that this defense is of no
avail if the employer has failed to comply with such federal statutory re-
quirements. So. Ry. v. Crockett, 234 U. S. 725, 34 Sup. Ct. 897 (1914).
The retention of this defense has subjected the act to criticism, particularly
in view of the subsequent state workmen's compensation laws which abolish
the defense of assumption of risk entirely. Note (1918) 3 MmL"N. L 1REV.
57; Buford, Assumption of Risk Under the Federal Employers' Liability
Act (1914) 28 HARv. L. REv. 163. It seems particularly harsh to those
whose occupations bring them within the federal act, for an employee com-
ing under it is barred from relief under a state statute. Ne, York Central
v. WTinfield, 244 U. S. 147, 37 Sup. Ct. 546 (1917) ; Note (1917) 2 M.l;. L.
RIlv. 49; Note (1927) 22 ILL. L. REv. 209. As a result, the federal act,
once inviting because of its liberalism, is now avoided wherever possible
as reactionary, and "interstate commerce" has been subjected to strained
interpretations to effect desirable results. Comment (1921) 9 CALIF. L.
REv. 260. By abolishing the defense of contributory negligence (leaing it
to be "considered" in the mitigation of damages) the courts are constrained
to distinguish between "contributory negligence" and "assumption of risk"
Seaboard Air Line v. Horton, 239 U. S. 595, 36 Sup. Ct. 180 (1916). In the
first case on this point, the Supreme Court predicated such a distinction upon
the supposed "contractual" nature of assumption of risk as opposed to the
"tortious" nature of contributory negligence. Seaboard Air Line v. Hor-
ton, 233 U. S. 492, 34 Sup. Ct. 635 (1914). But subsequent cases have left
the question in great confusion. Cf. Jacobs v,. Southern Ry., 241 U. S.
229, 36 Sup. Ct. 588 (1916); Cincinnati N. 0. & T. P. Ry. r. Thompson,
236 Fed. 1 (C. C. A. 6th, 1916); McAdoo v. Anzellotti, 271 Fed. 268 (C. C.
A. 2d, 1921). See Voorhees v. Central R. R. of N. J., 14 F. (2d) 899 (C.
C. A. 3rd, 1926) ; Hartwick v. Chicago & A. R. R., 286 Fed. 672 (C. C. A.
7th, 1922). In view of the plaintiff's necessity of suing under the federal
act and of the tenuous character of the distinction drawn between "contrib-
utory negligence" and "assumption of risk," the present result would seem
unfortunate and unnecessary as ."assumption of risk" ordinarily includes
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only such risks as are nor.mally incident to an occupation. Under cases
such as those cited supra, it would appear that the more carelessly the
plaintiff had acted, the greater the likelihood would have been of his acs
being construed as "contributory negligence," and hence no defense to the
defendant. Since the institution of the present suit, a new federal statute
abolishes all three common law defenses as to longshoremen and harbor
workers. 44 Stat. 1424 (Act Mar. 4, 1927); (1926) 16 Aim. LA on Lva.
REV. 127; see Note (1927) 36 YALE LAW JOUMRAL 414. However, the large
class of interstate railway employees are still protected only by the inade-
quate Federal Employers Act of 1908. An extension of the new act to
them would seem highly desirable.
REAL PROPERTY-CovENANT-ENJOINING BREACH THEREoF.-The grant-
ors of the defendant covenanted with the predecessors of the plaintiff that
only a single family house should be erected. In a suit to enjoin the de.
fendant from continuing to build a three family house it was held that a
mandatory injunction would not be granted since, inter alia, the violation
of the covenant was the result of mistake and the defendant had incurred
much expense before suit was brought. Bauby v. Krawow, 139 Atl. 508
(Conn. 1927).
Courts have denied relief in like situations where the defendant has had
notice of a restrictive covenant. Forstmann v. Joray Co., 224 N. Y. 22, 154
N. E. 652 (1926) (damage to defendant would not inure to plaintiff's
benefit); Forsee v. Jackson, 192 Mo. App. 408, 182 S. W. 783 (1916) (in-
junction deemed too drastic) ; Downs v. Kroeger, 254 Pac. 1101 (Cal. 1927)
(change of neighborhood); Straus v. Loudenslager, 96 N. J. Eq. 678, 127
Atl. 22 (1924) (violation held too slight); Lynch v. Union Institute, 159
Mlass. 306, 34 N. E. 364 (1893) (duration of covenant only 18 months).
But courts have generally issued mandatory injunctions when the defend-
ant was guilty of a wilful breach. Nechman v. Supplee, 236 Mich. 116, 210
N. W. 323 (1926); Stewart v. Finkelstone, 206 Mass. 28, 92 N. E. 37
(1910). Such courts stress the fact that it is the defendant's own agree-
ment that is being enforced. Spilling v. Hutcheson, 111 Va. 179, 68 S. E.
250 (1910) ; Cheatham v. Taylor, 138 S. E. 545 (Va. 1927). And the fact
-alone that expense is caused the defendant in enforcing the covenant will
not be sufficient to deny injunctive relief. Johnson v. Robertson, 156 Iowa
64, 135 N. W. 585 (1912); Lavan v. Menaker, 280 Pa. 591, 124 Atl. 733
(1924). On the other hand, like covenants have not been specifically en-
forced when the plaintiff's conduct has not met the approval of the court.
Gage v. Schavoir, 124 Atl. 535 (Conn. 1924) (plaintiff guilty of laches);
Union Trust Co. v. Best, 160 Cal. 263, 116 Pac. 737 (1911) (waiver of the
covenant). Since the factors that determine the disposition of each case are
subject to much discretion, viz, laches of the plaintiff, state of mind of the
defendant, status of the neighborhood and adequacy of damages, it is a
consideration of the relative monetary values involved on behalf of the
plaintiff and defendant that will generally determine the issue. Such con-
sideration would appear to have moved the instant court to deny the in-
junction. But the query remains whether one should be able to circumvent
legal obligations by "intrenchment behind considerable expenditure." Stew-
art v. Finkelstone, supra.
RECEIVERS-FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS-CoNFLICT OF JURISDICTION.-A
minority shareholder filed a bill in the state court, asking for the appoint-
ment of a receiver to carry on the business of the corporation. The attor-
ney for the corporation obtained a postponement of the hearing for a week
by agreeing that nothing would be done to disturb the status quo. Imme-
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diately thereafter he procured a non-resident creditor of the corporation to
file a bill in the federal district court, asking for the appointment of a
receiver to wind up the affairs of the corporation. The district court ap-
pointed the appellees the following day. Later, the state court ap-
pointed the appellants receivers. They requested the district court to
order the transfer of the property to them. Both the district court and
the United States Circuit Court of Appeals refused to issue the order. On
certiorari the Supreme Court held that the property should be surrendered
upon the condition that the appellants produce an order from the state
court affirming all that had been done in regard to the property and al-
lowing the bill to proceed as a creditor's bill in view of the insolvency of
the corporation. Harkin v. Brundage, 48 Sup. Ct. 268 (U. S. 1923).
Where a federal and state court both can take jurisdiction of a suit, the
tribunal whose jurisdiction first attaches retains exclusive jurisdiction and
control of the property involved. Farners' Loan and Trust Co. v. Leke
Street Elevated R. R., 177 U. S. 51, 2C Sup. Ct. 5G4 (1900); 1 Foster,
Federal Practice (6th ed. 1920) 190; see Note (1927) 41 L~nv. L. REv. 70.
The difficult question is as to when jurisdiction attaches. Where the issues,
subject matter and relief sought in the two courts are practically identical,
the court in which the bill is filed and from which process issucs first ob-
tains jurisdiction without obtaining either actual or constructive powsezzion
of the property. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. v. La:c Street El. R. R.,
supra; Ward v. Foulkrod, 264 Fed. 627 (C. C. A. 3d, 1920); see Kline v.
Burke Construction Co., 260 U. S. 226, 229, 43 Sup. Ct. 79, 32 (1922). If
the two proceedings are not substantially identical, but control of the same
property is involved in each, the court which first obtains actual or con-
dtructive possession of the property by appointing a receiver obtains ex-
clusive control over the property even though the suit in the other court
is pending. Knudsen v. First Trust and Savings Bank, 245 Fed. 81 (C. C.
1. 9th, 1917). The Circuit Court of Appeals decided the instant case on
the ground that the two bills were not similar in purpose and that the fed-
eral court obtained exclusive jurisdiction over the property by appointing
the receivers. Harkin v. Brundage, 13 F. (2d) 617 (C. C. A. 7th, 1920).
The Supreme Court accepted this as the correct view on the face of the
pleadings, but held that the federal courts should refuse to take advantage
of the fraud practiced upon the state court. The decision should be com-
mended as tending to prevent conflict between the two systems and as
tending to discourage collusive proceedings of this kind. The condition
imposed upon the state court receivers was necessitated by the fact that
rights of innocent creditors had become involved.
TAXATIoN-TRANSFER TAX ON TRUST FUND WLERE BENEFICIAnRES DO NOT
RECEIVE INCOME UNTIL SE'rLoi's DEATH.-M3f conveyed certain shares in
the capital stock of X Company to T in trust on the following terms: AT
reserved the power to draw from the fund, in any year in which her per-
sonal income from other sources was less than a specified amount, to the
extent of that difference. T was directed to pay such sums to charities as
M should specify, out of the net income, the residue of 'which was to be
added to the principal. After M's death one third of the income was to
be paid to each of her children; provided, however, that if all the children
predeceased .41, the trust should terminate. A reserved the power to revoke
the trust with the consent of any one child, and also the power to vote the
shares of stock. At M'fs death a transfer tax was imposed on the trust c:-.
tate. Held, on appeal, that since the transfer was "intended to take effect
in possession or enjoyment" after the settlor's death, the tax was properly
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assessed under Ill. Rev. Stat (1927) c. 120, § 396. People v. McCormick,
158 N. E. 861 (Ill. 1927).
The statutes of several states impose a tax on transfers "intended to
take effect in possession or enjoyment" at or after the trustor's death. 40
Stat. 1097 (U. S. 1919); Mass. Gen. Laws (1921) c. 65, § 1; N. Y. Cons.
Laws (1909) c. 61, § 220, par. 4. The mere fact that a trust is revocable
or its beneficiaries subject to be changed by the settlor does not render it
taxable under such a statute. People v. Northern Trust Co., 289 Ill. 475,
124 N. E. 662 (1919) ; Dexter v. Treas. & Rec'r Gen., 243 Mass. 523, 137
N. E. 877 (1923); see Comment (1926) 35 YALE LAW JOURNAL 601. Nor
does the added fact that the trustor retains the power to vote the shares
of stock comprising the trust fund suffice to bring the transfer within the
provision. Matter of Kountze, 120 Misc. 289, 198 N. Y. Supp. 442 (Surr.
Ct., 1923), It has been contended that where the trust is complete and
valid, and the interests thereby created become vested at the time of its
creation, the trust is not subject to the tax. Stimson, Taxation of Revoc-
able Trusts (1927) 25 MICH. L. REV. 839. But it seems to be generally held
that such a trust is taxable at the donor's death where he has reserved to
himself the income for life. Saltonstall v. Treas. & Rec'r Gen., 256 Mass.
519, 153 N. E. 4 (1926) ; People v. Welch's Estate, 235 Mich. 555, 209 N. W.
930 (1926) (amount of trust estate necessary to produce annuity reserved
to donor is taxable); (1922) 31 YALE LAW JOURNAL 671. The suggestion
has also been made that the statutory clause under consideration Will be
construed as referring to the time when the beneficiary's interest has be-
come technically vested where no attempt at tax evasion appears. Note
(1925) 74 U. PA. L. REV. 176. But the cases do not seem to support this
proposition. McCaughn v. Girard Trust Co., 11 F. (2d) 520 (C. C. A. 3d,
1926) ; Moore v. Bugbee, 128 Atl. 679 (N. J. 1925), aff'd 135 At. 919 (N.
J. 1926). So that a transfer is not deemed to take effect in possession or
enjoyment until the beneficiary actually receives the beneficial interest.
Pratt ,. Dean, 246 Mass. 300, 140 N. E. 924 (1923); Bank & Trust Co. v.
Doughton, 188 N. C. 762, 125 S. E. 621 (1924). This is very probably in
accord with the legislative intent. In the instant case the transfer is clearly
taxable since the beneficiaries had neither a vested nor a beneficial interest
until the settler's death.
TORTS-ACTION BY WIFE AGAINST HUSBAND FOR PERSONAL ToRT.-The
plaintiff sued her husband for malicious prosecution under the Domestic
Relations Law, § 57 [N. Y. Cons. Laws (Cahill, 1923) c. 14, § 57] which
gives a married woman a right of action for injury to her person, as if un-
married. The complaint was dismissed in Special Term on the ground that
such an action will not lie between husband and wife. This order was
affirmed without opinion by the Appellate Division. Held, on appeal, (two
judges dissenting) that the judgment be affirmed, since' the later acts of
the legislature have not altered the rule adopted in Schultz v. Schultz, 89
N. Y. 644 (1882). Allen v. Allen, 159 N. E. 656 (N. Y. 1927).
The sharp conflict as to whether a wife may sue a husband in a civil
action for wrong to her person under the Married Women Acts has con-
tinued in spite of many predictions that the liberal rule allowing such ac-
tions was gradually gaining headway. See Comment (1923) 33 YALE LAW
JOURNAL 315, 317, n. 9. There are far more recent decisions refusing such
suits than allowing them. Clark v. Clark, 11 F. (2d) 871 (S. D. N. Y.
1925), aff'd 11 F. (2d) 871 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926); Harvey v. Harvey, 239
Mich. 142, 214 N. NV. 305 (1927) ; Riser v. Riser, 240 Mich. 402, 215 N. W.
290 (1927); Emerson v. Western Seed & Irrigation Co., 216 N. W. 297
(Neb. 1927); Austin v. Austin, 136 Miss. 61, 100 So. 591 (1924); In ro
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Dolmage's Estate, 212 N. W. 553 (Iowa, 1927). An action for wilful in-
juries has been allowed. Crowell v. Crowcdl, 180 N. C. 516, 105 S. E. 206
(1920). And some states have granted recovery for negligent injuries.
Wait v. Pierce, 191 Wis. 202, 209 N. W. 475 (1926); Bushnell v. Bushnell,
103 Conn. 583, 131 AtL. 432 (1925); Roberts v. Roberts, 185 N. C. 566, 118
S. E. 9 (1923). Some of the Married Women Statutes provide for recovery
for injuries caused by the wrongful act of any person [Iowa Code (1927)
§ 10462], or expressly enable a husband and wife to sue each other. Miss.
Ann. Code (Hemingway, 1927) §§ 2185, 2186. Nevertheless Iowa has in-
terpreted the statute as merely granting greater damages in actions
against third parties and no action against a spouse. See In re Dolmages
Estate, supra, at 554. While Mississippi nullified the statute by interpreting
it to mean that the right to sue is acquired only if a "cause of action" pre-
viously existed. Austin v. Austin, supra. Another type of statute merely en-
ables a married woman to acquire and deal with all property as if unmar-
ried. Mich. Comp. Laws (1915) § 11485; cf. N. C. Cons. Stat. (1919) §§
408, 454, 2506; Neb. Comp. Stat. (1922) §§ 1509-1511; N. Y. Cons. Laws
(Cahill, 1923) c. 14, § 57; Conn. Gen. Stat. (1918) § 5274. But under these
statutes diametrically opposite results have nevertheless been reached on the
instant question. Cf. instant case and Crowell v. Crowell, supra. It seems
therefore, that little can be predicated on the wording of the statute. The pozi-
tion of the instant court in relying upon an unbroken line of precedent even
though confronted by a very strong set of facts is understandable. Never-
theless, efforts, such as are found in the dissenting opinion, to repudiate the
fictional unity of husband and wife as a basis of decision are commendable.
An insurance company is often the real party defendant in negligence cases.
Denial of relief in such case may be justified because of the strong pos-
sibility of fraud against the company. But it obviously does not follow
that relief should be denied in wilful injury cases.
TORTS-DEFAMATION-TRUTH AS A DEFENSE-"'RIGHT OF PiuvAcy."--The
defendant posted a sign in the show window of his garage to the effect
that the plaintiff owed him an account and that if promises would pay it,
the bill would have been settled long ago. In an action for libel, truth
was set up as a defense under a statute. Hed, on appeal, that the judg-
ment for the plaintiff below be affirmed, since this was not an action for
libel, but one for the invasion of the plaintiff's "right of privacy."
Brents v. Morgan, 299 S. W. 967 (Ky. 1927).
Although the rule is much voiced that truth is a complete defense to libel,
courts which purport to follow it have avoided its application in situations
similar to that of the instant case. Thus, placarding a debtor's house with
a request to call and pay his debts has been held actionable. Thompson v.
Adelberg, 181 Ky. 487, 205 S. W. 558 (1918). And a duty to pay damages
was imposed on a defendant who attached to furniture on the sidewalk in
front of his store the following legend: "Taken from [the plaintiff] who
would not pay for it. Moral? Beware of dead beats." Woodling v.
Knickerbocker, 31 Minn. 268, 17 N. W. 387 (1883). Likewise, a creditor
has been held to be under a duty not to post large yellow signs advertising
a debtor's accounts for sale. Green v. Mines, 22 Ont. Rep. 77 (1891).
In a case almost identical with the instant case, tort responsibility was im-
posed. Davis v. Wetzer, City Ct. N. Y. (1889) (barber placed customer's
shaving mug in window with the inscription: "This man owes me for shav-
ing $1.15 since 1885). In none of the foregoing cases was the result la-
belled "right of privacy" in order to avoid the ordinary libel rule. And it
is believed that in the past the "right of privacy" category has been con-
fined to cases involving the use of a person's name or portrait for adver-
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tising or trade purposes. See Comment (1928) 1 So. CALIF. L. REV. 293,
295. In some states, by statute, truth is only a complete defense to libel
when published from justifiable motives. Under that rule damages were
allowed for sending a letter to a debtor with the name of an organization
for collecting bad debts on the envelope. Missouri v. Armstrong, 106 Mo,
395, 16 S. W. 604 (1891). And for publishing in a newspaper that the
plaintiff refused to pay his debts. Turner v. Brien, 184 Iowa 320, 167 N.
W. 584 (1918). Moreover, publication in a newspaper that the plaintiff
had failed to pay overdue taxes was held actionable in the absence of such
a statute as that mentioned above, the court broadly approving the rule
that truth is not a complete defense when the publication is from unjusti-
fiable motives. Hutchins v. Page, 75 N. H. 215, 72 Atl. 689 (1909); see
Burkhart v. No. American Co., 214 Pa. 39, 43, 63 Atl. 410, 411 (1906). It
may be accurately predicted that courts will not permit resort to such obnox-
ious methods of collecting debts whether or not the libel rule in a given
jurisdiction states truth to be an absolute defense. And it would seem
to be rather obvious that the right created in the instant case was classified
as a "right of privacy" in order to avoid any embarrassment which might
arise from calling it a libel.
TRUSTS-WHEN IIPERFECT GIFT MAY BE DECLARATION OF TnuST.-An
envelope containing bonds was found in the deceased's safe-deposit box
with the words "all in envelope belong to Anna C. Miller" written thereon.
Inside on a slip of paper signed by the deceased was written: "Whatever
is in this envelope belongs to Miss Anna C. Miller." The evidence showed
that the deceased had purchased these bonds. In an action by Anna C.
Miller against the deceased's administratrix, the court, reversing a directed
verdict of the trial court in favor of the plaintiff, dismissed the complaint,
holding that the writing was an imperfect gift which equity would not
perfect by converting into a declaration of trust. Miller v. Silverman,
224 N. Y. Supp. 609 (2d Dept. 1927).
The English Court of Chancery, after Ex Parte Pye, 18 Ves. 140 (1811),
extended for a time the doctrine there expressed so as to enforce as declara-
tions of trust gifts imperfectly executed. Richardson v. Richardson, L. R.
3 Eq. 686 (1867) (attempted assignment of notes ineffectual because of
lack of endorsement); Morgan v. Mallegon, L. R. 10 Eq. 475 (1870) (mem-
orandum stating "I hereby give and make over to M an India bond" given
to M, but bond itself never delivered). Later English decisions, however,
do not enforce as a trust an imperfect gift unless there is a clear intent
to establish a trust. Richards v. Delbridge, L. R. 18 Eq. 11 (1874) (mem-
orandum made stating that a lease and stock in trade was given to E. but
ao actual delivery except that of the lease to donee's mother) ; Heartley v.
Vicholson, L. R. 19 Eq. 233 (1875) (ineffectual written instrument). Ex-
sept for the approval by way of dictum of the cases of Richardson v. Rich-
ardson, supra, and Morgan v. Malleson, supra, in Hellenstein's Estate, 77
Pa. St. 328, 331 (1875), the courts of this country have universally fol-
lowed the later English view. Young v. Young, 80 N. Y. 422 (1880); Beck
v. Staudt, 149 App. Div. 35, 133 N. Y. Supp. 529 (1st Dept. 1912), aff'd
208 N. Y. 566, 101 N. E. 1095 (1913) ; Mitchell v. Weaver, 242 Mass. 331,
136 N. E. 166 (1922) ; Eschen v. Steers, 10 F. (2d) 739 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926) ;
Graves, Gifts of Perdonalty (1896) 1 VA. L. REG. 878; 3 Pomeroy, Equity
Jurisprudence (4th ed. 1918). 6 997. The difficulty arises in determining
what acts or declarations will be construed as evidence of an intention to
-reate a trust. The distinction in some cases is very slight. An intention
to create a trust was not found in cases where certificates of stocks or
bonds were placed in a safe-deposit box in an envelope bearing words in-
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dicating that the enclosed belonged to plaintiff. Young v. Young, cupra;
Gegan v. Union Trust Co., 129 App. Div. 184, 113 N. Y. Supp. 595 (Ist
Dept. 1908), aff'd 198 N. Y. 541, 92 N. E. 1085 (1910); Bccl v. Staudt,
supra; Shea v. Crofut, 203 App. Div. 210, 196 N. Y. Supp. 850 (2d Dept
1922) (also evidence of oral declarations that plaintiff was to have the
bonds). Contra: Cahian v. Bank of Lasscn Co., 11 Cal. App. 5.13, 105 Pac.
765 (1909) (also evidence of oral statements that deceased had given cer-
tificates to plaintiff); Knagenhelm v. Rhode Island Ho-vital Trzut Co.,
43 R. 1. 559, 114 AtI. 5 (1921) (writing stated that the stock was held in
trust for plaintiff). Likewise there was not sufficient evidence of an inten-
tion to create a trust where money was deposited in a bank in the de-
ceased's name and the deceased frequently stated it was plaintiff's. Smith-
wick v. Bank of Coming, 95 Ark. 463, 130 S. W. 166 (1910). Contra:
McCaffrey v. North Adams Saving Baak, 244 Mass. 396, 138 N. E. 393
(1923) (deposit was made in deceased's name as trustee). Nor where
there was an attempted assignment which failed because of lack of delivery.
Wald v. Hazelton, 137 N. Y., 215, 33 N. E. 143 (1893) (bond and mort-
gage); Poff v. Poff, 128 Va. 62, 104 S. E. 719 (1920) (debt); Executive
Committee v. Shaver, 146 Va. 73, 135 S. E. 714 (1926) (notes). Nor
where there has been an attempted gift, incomplete for lack of delivery.
Noble v. Learned, 153 Cal. 245, 94 Pac. 1047 (1908); In re Ashman'n
Estate, 223 Pa. 543, 72 AtI. 899 (1909); Trubcy -v. Pease, 240 Ill. 513, 88
N. E. 1005 (1909); C&rdoza v. Leveroni, 233 Mass. 310, 123 N. E. 672
(1919); Howard v. Dingley, 122 Me. 5, 118 Atl. 592 (1922). The principal
case is one on whose facts all courts would probably refuse to find an in-
tent to create a trust.
